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Abstract
This article examines intersection of three contemporary issues that occupy 
academic thought intensively: China’s global politics, its changing voting practice at 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), and the international response to the civil 
war in Syria. The aim of the article is to provide quantitative and qualitative analysis of 
China’s voting practice in the UNSC regarding the civil war in Syria, to outline a legal 
and political interpretation of its voting patterns and to conceptualise China’s politics 
in the UNSC regarding this issue. The article argues that reasons behind China’s rapidly 
growing use of the veto in the UNSC regarding Syria are vaguely related to the case of 
Syria itself, but directly reflect the primacy of China’s domestic politics and its strategic 
aspirations to reshape global governance. Growing concern within the international 
community about the human rights abuses taking place on a mass scale against Uighurs 
in Xinjiang is the most prominent catalyst that enables and provokes China’s systemic 
reaction. Therefore, although China has neither geopolitical nor strategic interests in 
Syria, Syria’s case serves as a battleground for China’s attempts to transform the col-
lectively accepted interpretation of multilateralism, democratic values, and norms. This 
aspect underlines the necessity to observe China’s politics from the perspective of social 
constructivism. Methodologically, this article draws on political discourse analysis theory, 
examines China’s arguments in the UNSC and argues that China’s voting behaviour in 
the UNSC regarding Syria focused on reinterpretation of two grand concepts of inter-
national law: state sovereignty and non-interference.
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Introduction
The Syrian civil war has been on the UNSC agenda since 2011. If compared to 
other United Nations Security Council (UNSC) agenda items, it could be characterised 
as one of the most complex, and the list of international security issues regarding this 
case includes deaths of hundreds of thousands of people, the use of chemical weapons 
by Bashar al-Assad’s regime, the humanitarian situation, sanctions, military engage-
ment of third parties and clashing interests of UNSC permanent members. Nevertheless, 
the case of Syria has been a regular subject of a veto in the UNSC by Russia and China 
(a “tandem veto”) or by Russia with China abstaining. In no case has China exercised 
a “lone veto”. Moreover, Syria’s case is the turning point in China’s voting behaviour in 
the UNSC: since 2011, it has cast the veto 13 times, and only one of these vetoes has not 
been related to the case of Syria. 
This article examines the radical shift in China’s voting practice in the UNSC 
and gives a legal and political interpretation of it. Traditionally, when observing atypical 
international behaviour, geopolitical, economic, or strategic interests of the involved 
party are being sought in a particular country or region in a manner of neo-realism 
and from the point of view of the balance of power. Nevertheless, there is no evidence 
of China’s direct interests in Syria. China’s specific voting behaviour since the very 
beginning of the crisis in Syria has been regarded as unclear. This article, by conducting 
political discourse analysis of UNSC meeting records, shows that the answer is not to 
be sought in the light of neo-realism and the balance of power theory, but rather in 
the domain of social constructivism, which emphasises the aspect of value systems, 
norms and ideas that determine state behaviour and mutual relations in the interna-
tional environment. 
The article is structured in three parts that lead from quantitative analysis of 
the voting behaviour in the UNSC to qualitative political discourse analysis explaining 
China’s vote and analytical conclusions about the motivation that stands behind China’s 
international politics regarding the Syrian civil war and dramatic change of voting behav-
iour. First, the article outlines that the quantitative view can lead to the conclusion that 
the case of Syria illustrates and exposes a convergence of China’s and Russia’s interests or 
even worldviews. Nevertheless, the second part of the article shows that China’s behaviour 
is characterised by a noticeably clear emphasis on the principles and interpretation of 
aspects of multilateralism and international norms, therefore China’s voting practice in 
Syria’s case must be observed in a wider perspective and separately from Russia’s politics 
towards Syria. Third, this article emphasises that China’s motivation behind the voting 
practice in the UNSC is related to its domestic politics and a possibility to reinterpret 
two grand concepts of international law: state sovereignty and non-interference in a way 
that helps maintain stability at home.
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1 Use of the Veto in the UN Security Council Regarding 
the Syrian Civil War: The Quantitative Aspect
The veto power of the five permanent members of the Council is the term com-
monly used with regard to the provision of Article 27, para. 3 of the Charter of the United 
Nations, which provides that: 
“Decisions of the Security Council on all other matters shall be made by an affirma-
tive vote of nine members including the concurring votes of the permanent members” 
(United Nations Charter). 
The right to a veto was granted to the permanent members of the Security Council 
with the aim to prevent the UN from acting in cases of opposition expressed by super-
powers, and the initial debate was more focused on the scope of this right, and not on 
the question whether the superpowers should be granted veto power (Kennedy, 2006). 
Although recently the UN celebrated its 75th anniversary, this right has not been abol-
ished despite the tectonic changes in the international system, the collapse of bipolarity, 
numerous reform attempts and claims concerning its non-democratic nature. 
The use of the veto at the UNSC has historically reflected evolutionary phases 
of the organisation (for example, admission of new members), events taking place in 
the international environment and permanent members’ geopolitical and strategic aspira-
tions vis-à-vis one another and regarding specific regional and international conflicts. 
After the Cold War, the veto powers were used very rarely, and, up until 2011, their use 
in most cases was related to the conflict in the Middle East – the Israel-Palestine conflict 
(Security Council – Veto List, 2021). Nevertheless, the dynamics of the use of the veto 
rights since 2011 have changed again (Fig. 1), and the Syrian civil war is the conflict where 
permanent members’ positions clash. 
The new veto dynamics that have emerged with respect to the Syrian civil war 
preoccupy the minds of academic and political circles because of the China factor. Unlike 
Russia (formerly the USSR), historically China has been the UNSC permanent member 
that has chosen to use its veto rights in exceedingly rare cases – only once during the Cold 
War (the resolution on admission of Bangladesh as a new UN member state), and two 
times in the period till 2000 (the resolutions on the situation in the former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, and with regard to Central American efforts toward peace and 
stability in Guatemala (Security Council – Veto List 2021). Nevertheless, in 1997, a change 
in the pattern became visible with blocked resolutions on the situation in Zimbabwe 
and Myanmar. The outbreak of the civil war in Syria in 2011, however, proved to be 
the turning point in China’s voting behaviour at the UNSC. During the last ten years, 
China has used the veto rights in the UNSC a total of 11 times (Table 1), and 10 of those 
have been focused on a single conflict – the civil war in Syria. The only exception from 
this predominant tendency is the US resolution on the situation in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, which China blocked in 2019 (U.N. Doc S/PV.8476).
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Source: Author’s calculations based on Security Council – Veto List (2021).
Figure 1. Use of the Veto in the United Nations Security Council (1946–2020)
This trend in voting behaviour is accompanied by another one – the tandem veto 
by China and Russia. Since 1999, China has never cast a lone veto. All of China’s 10 vetoes 
which have been clustered on Syria’s case were cast in tandem with Russia. In addition, all 
the other Russian vetoes with regard to Syria and the ongoing conflict there are comple-
mented with China’s abstention (Fig. 2). From the point of view of a legal interpretation, as 
the International Court of Justice has declared, voluntary abstention by a UNSC permanent 
member does not have the same effect as a negative vote (a veto) and the adoption of resolu-
tions with a permanent member abstaining has become a customary practice at the UNSC 
and it is considered an integral part of UN constitutional law (Legal Consequences for…, 
1971; Bailey, 1974; Stavropoulos, 1967). Although China’s abstention alone cannot block 
the adoption of the decision, the tendency to vote together with Russia stands out.
Therefore, from a quantitative point of view, a remarkably simple algorithm is 
observable with no deviations regarding vetoed resolutions in Syria’s case: China and 
Russia either vote together, or China abstains when Russia blocks. This clear tendency has 
prompted conjectures about coordinated action and policy between China and Russia, 
common regional or global geopolitical interests.
It must be noted that China or Russia have not vetoed all resolutions concerning 
the Syrian civil war – less than half of them were vetoed (Fig. 2), while a majority were 
adopted, and that leads to the necessity to analyse the reasons for negative votes.
Socrates RSU elektroniskais juridisko zinātnisko rakstu žurnāls 2021, Nr. 2 (20)
 
— 103 —
Gunda Reire. China’s Voting Practice at the UN Security Council,   
Its Legal and Political Interpretation: Case of Syria
Table 1. Vetoed UNSC resolutions on the Syrian Civil War (2011–2020)
No Date Resolution Vote* Veto Abstention
1 10.07.2020 S/2020/667 13-2-0 China, Russia
2 07.07.2020 S/2020/654 13-2-0 China, Russia
3 20.12.2019 S/2019/961 13-2-0 China, Russia
4 19.09.2019 S/2019/756 12-2-1 China, Russia Equatorial Guinea
5 10.04.2018 S/2018/321 12-2-1 Russia (Bolivia voted against) China
6 17.11.2017 S/2017/970 12-2-1 Russia (Bolivia voted against) China
7 16.11.2017 S/2017/962 11-2-2 Russia (Bolivia voted against) China, Egypt
8 24.10.2017 S/2017/884 11-2-2 Russia (Bolivia voted against) China, Kazakhstan
9 12.04.2017 S/2017/315 10-2-3 Russia (Bolivia voted against) China, Ethiopia, 
Kazakhstan




11 05.12.2016 S/2016/1026 11-3-1 China, Russia (Venezuela voted 
against)
Angola
12 08.10.2016 S/2016/846 11-2-2 Russia (Venezuela voted 
against)
Angola, China
13 22.05.2014 S/2014/348 13-2-0 China, Russia
14 19.07.2012 S/2012/538 11-2-2 China, Russia Pakistan, South Africa
15 04.02.2012 S/2012/77 13-2-0 China, Russia
16 04.10.2011 S/2011/612 9-2-4 China, Russia Brazil, India, Lebanon, 
South Africa
* Votes cast: For-Against-Abstention
Source: Author’s calculations based on Security Council – Veto List (2021).
Source: Author’s calculations based on Security Council – Veto List (2021).
Figure 2. Adopted and Vetoed UNSC Resolutions with Respect to the Syrian 
Civil War (1946–2020) 
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In addition, the so-called “pocket veto”, or the threatened use of veto, is not included 
in the statistics, as such records are Available fromly in a case when a draft resolution is 
circulated as a UNSC document and followed by a discussion in the UNSC. Nevertheless, 
the pocket veto has a considerable impact on the UNSC’s ability to act effectively.
2 China’s Vetoes Regarding the Case of 
Syria: Political Discourse Analysis
Three aspects dominate in the UNSC regarding the case of Syria – political, 
humanitarian, and use of chemical weapons, and all of these have been a subject of veto 
cast by China. Clarifications provided for a veto or abstention related to UNSC votes 
with respect to the civil war in Syria have been more general and more concise from 
China than from Russia. Nevertheless, this does not mean that China lacked arguments. 
2.1 First Vetoes: the Political Aspect
Without a doubt, China’s first vetoes regarding the conflict in Syria came as 
a surprise to the international society. Since then, there have been many attempts to 
explain this manifest shift in voting behaviour, and the searches have predominantly 
been directed towards the domain of China’s eventual political, geostrategic or eco-
nomic interests in Syria. Other directions of inquiry have been related to possible joint 
geopolitical efforts and common interests with Russia. Nevertheless, presumptions and 
inferences were imbued with the spirit of realism and the idea of the balance of power, 
and they have not provided valid answers. 
In fact, China’s basic arguments regarding the resolution of the Syrian crisis were 
outlined already alongside its first vetoes in 2011 and 2012, and they have not changed 
at their core during the coming years. These principles are state sovereignty, non-inter-
ference, territorial integrity, and the imperative to seek political settlements to conflict, 
accompanied by claims and assertions concerning China’s firm position on each of these 
principles: 
 “[…] it [the international community – auth.] should fully respect Syria’s sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity. Whether the Security Council takes further 
action on the question of Syria should depend upon whether it would facilitate the easing 
of tension in Syria, help to defuse differences through political dialogue and contribute 
to the maintenance of peace and stability in the Middle East. Most important, it should 
depend upon whether it complies with the Charter of the United Nations and the prin-
ciple of non-interference in the internal affairs of States […] The Chinese Government’s 
position on those questions has been consistent and firm.” (U.N. Doc. S/PV.6627)
For the full picture, China’s attitude on sanctions must also be considered; since 
the very outbreak of the crisis in Syria, China has adamantly opposed sanctions and 
the threat of sanctions, and this aspect must also be seen in the context of the stated 
principles. With its first vetoes, China made it clear that it does not see sanctions as 
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a tool for conflict resolution, since it puts pressure on a certain government. Instead of 
sanctions or restrictive measures, it prefers mediation as a tool towards a political solu-
tion to a conflict:
 “Mr. Annan’s mediation is an important and realistic way forward towards a political 
solution of the Syrian issue. […] However, the draft resolution essentially undermined 
the consensus reached at the Geneva meeting and seriously disrupted the new round 
of mediation efforts undertaken by Joint Special Envoy Annan.” (U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810)
In the years following its first string of vetoes, China stuck to this position. 
Moreover, already in 2012, China signalled that it opposes the international pressure on 
Bashar al-Assad’s regime not only in the form of sanctions, but it opposes sanctions in 
general. Nevertheless, the argumentation does not contain any sign of sympathies towards 
the regime in question, but rather it concentrates on the principle of non-interference, 
and stability of other regional governments:
 “First, the draft resolution is seriously flawed, and its unbalanced content seeks to 
put pressure on only one party. Experience has shown that such a practice would not 
help resolve the Syrian issue, but would only derail the matter from the political track. 
It would not only further aggravate the turmoil, but also cause it to spread to other 
countries of the region, undermine regional peace and stability, and ultimately harm 
the interests of the people of Syria and other regional countries.” (U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810)
It must be noted that while China has no particular interests in Syria and that 
China’s voting behaviour is not oriented toward or targeted at Syria or the civil war 
there, it remains a grand battleground in which principles and understanding of con-
temporary international relations are at stake, and this was outlined very explicitly in 
2012. Such a detailed explanation did not appear again in later statements by China 
and seemed to be forgotten by the international community since the focus of concerns 
was directed at China’s aggressive economic policy, rapid growth, and aspirations for 
global power:
 “[…] sovereign equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries are 
the basic norms governing inter-State relations enshrined in the Charter of the United 
Nations. China has no self-interest in the Syrian issue. We have consistently maintained 
that the future and fate of Syria should be independently decided by the Syrian people, 
rather than imposed by outside forces. We believe that the Syrian issue must be resolved 
through political means and that military means would achieve nothing. That is China’s 
consistent position on international affairs. It is not targeted at any specific incident or 
moment. Our purpose is […] to protect […] the basic standards that govern international 
relations.” (U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810)
The political rhetoric that appeared in 2012 and which persists to this day also con-
cerns China’s involvement in the process as a permanent member, and signals the neces-
sity to consider China’s position and the principles it highlights more seriously, otherwise 
adoption of a particular resolution can and will be blocked. This situation characterises 
the aspect that in legal literature is described as the threat of a veto or a pocket veto, 
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and it is often as effective as an actual veto as it conveys an unambiguous message to 
participants in the process of drafting a resolution:
 “[…] the sponsoring countries failed to show any political will or cooperativeness, 
adopting a rigid and arrogant approach to the reasonable basic concerns of other con-
cerned countries and refusing to make revisions. It is even more regrettable that, in 
circumstances where the parties were still seriously divided and there was still time for 
continued consultations, the sponsoring countries refused to heed the calls for further 
consultation made by China, some other Council members and Joint Special Envoy 
Annan […] and pressed for a vote on the draft resolution. China is strongly opposed to 
such practices.” (U.N. Doc. S/PV.6810)
Russia and China engaged in a tandem veto of a resolution in which the issue 
of Syria would have been handed over for examination by the ICC (the International 
Criminal Court). All other UNSC members voted in favour of the resolution, supporting 
the need for accountability when war crimes and atrocities have taken place. This reso-
lution had 65 co-sponsoring countries. In its argument, China did not go into much 
detail but it did repeat its usual references to state sovereignty as well as the principle of 
complementarity, thereby questioning the legitimacy of the ICC itself as an institution:
 “China is not a State party to the Rome Statute. China always has reservations con-
cerning the referral by the Security Council of particular country situations to the ICC. 
This is our principled position. […] In the current circumstances, to forcibly refer 
the situation in Syria to the ICC is not conducive either to building trust among all 
parties in Syria or to an early resumption of the negotiations in Geneva.” (Explanatory 
Remarks by…, 2014)
Therefore, with its very first vetoes, a reference to state sovereignty and non-inter-
ference can be clearly seen in China’s argumentation. Nevertheless, China’s interpretation 
of these principles is the most important part of its behaviour, but the reasons and modus 
operandi become clearer only with the next vetoes and abstentions in combination with 
the resolutions that China supported. Thus, by learning on the ground, the international 
community has become familiar with the interpretation of multilateralism that China 
favours and supports or vice-versa – blocks and rejects.
2.2 Vetoes Regarding the Humanitarian Situation
The strongest disappointment and negative reaction have been observed after China 
blocked resolutions on delivery of humanitarian aid and improvement of the humani-
tarian situation in Syria. China carefully considers how each move the UNSC makes fits 
in with its understanding of the principles and it gives unmistakeable signals about its 
readiness to use the veto under certain circumstances, as well as that the result will be 
positive for all if countries fall in line. 
When China has used its veto power or abstained, the explanation for its vote 
refers to non-interference in matters concerning Syria’s sovereignty and actions taken 
in a manner so that there will be no infringement on the principle state sovereignty. In 
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effect, China has politicised humanitarian assistance while at the same time criticising 
and reproaching other countries for doing the same. China emphasises that it is neces-
sary also with deliveries of humanitarian assistance to respect Syria’s sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and to cooperate fully with the regime of Bashar al-Assad:
 “All categories of humanitarian issues in Syria should be considered in a comprehensive 
manner and be addressed in a balanced way, instead of only selectively focusing on 
certain issues, much less to politicise humanitarian issues. The international community 
must fully respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria; 
fully listen to the views of the Syrian government; and seek a comprehensive solution to 
the Syria issue through political means.” (Statement by Ambassador…, 2019b)
This argumentation represents the very essence of China’s position: sovereignty, 
non-interference, coordination with the official government even in situations where 
the official government is an authoritarian regime that is directly engaged in repressions 
of its own people as well as employing chemical weapons. China is using this massive 
humanitarian catastrophe as a case which is in the spotlight of the international com-
munity’s attention and can be instrumentalised to communicate to the international 
community an understanding of China’s principles and how they will be applied. 
In the explanations provided for the use of its veto power, China underlines 
the need to lift unilateral sanctions against Syria and to evaluate the impact of sanc-
tions on the humanitarian situation in Syria. In this way, China clearly points to its 
interpretation and perspective on how sanctions represent violation of sovereignty and 
interference in another country’s internal affairs. When China talks about sanctions, 
they are presented as “illegal sanctions” or “unilateral coercive measures”:
“It must be pointed out that unilateral coercive measures have further aggravated 
the economic and humanitarian crisis in Syria. Years of illegal sanctions have had 
immeasurable impact […]. The unilateral coercive measures have also severely under-
mined Syria’s capacity to respond to COVID-19. […] China proposed amendments to 
the draft resolution. It is disappointing that the draft resolution submitted by copen-
holders completely ignores China’s amendments and does not contain a single word 
about unilateral coercive measures. China is compelled to vote against such an unobjec-
tive and unbalanced draft resolution.” (Explanation of Vote…, 2020a)
China diligently promotes its understanding of sovereignty and territorial integrity, 
by urging acceptance of a Syrian-led and Syrian-owned political process:
 “China has been working tirelessly to help bring about a solution to the issue of Syria, 
supports the United Nations as the major player in terms of good offices and has been 
facilitating finding a settlement among the parties that is acceptable to all through 
peaceful negotiations and based on the principle of a Syrian-owned and -led process.” 
(Statement by Ambassador, 2017a)
China’s understanding of multilateral cooperation, which it promotes by threats 
of a veto, is a regular element in the UNSC debates. For example, in spite of the pres-
sure from the international community to find solutions to the escalating humanitarian 
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catastrophe in Syria without delay and in spite of the siege and bombing of Aleppo by 
the Syrian government, the UNSC was still unable to agree at its meeting on the 8th 
of October about how to address the crisis. At that time, China abstained, offering its 
standard argument with the combination of sovereignty and territorial integrity as well 
as what it calls a non-inclusive approach:
 “The draft resolution submitted by France and Spain […] contains a number of humani-
tarian situations and enhanced efforts to combat terrorism. However, some of the draft 
resolution’s provisions do not fully respect the sovereignty, independence, unity and 
territorial integrity of Syria. Moreover, the constructive views of some Security Council 
members were not incorporated.” (Statement by Ambassador…, 2016)
Therefore, the Chinese discourse is focused on preserving multilateralism but in 
a reformulated version, and with a process of consultations among countries which filters 
and excludes contradictory views and diversity of opinions.
2.3 Explanation of the Veto: Resolutions on 
the Use of Chemical Weapons in Syria
The most complicated question, in which interests of UNSC members were 
opposed, was the determination of the responsibility in 2017 for the use of chemical 
weapons in Syria and the extension of the mandate of the joint investigative mecha-
nism (JIM) of the OPCW (The Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons). 
The UNSC failed in adopting a resolution that would impose sanctions for the use of 
chemical weapons in Syria because Russia and China voted in tandem to veto it. China’s 
argument was compact; once again, China appealed for unity at the UNSC while, at 
the same time, breaking that unity with its veto:
 “At present, investigations on the use of chemicals as weapons are ongoing, and it is 
therefore too early to reach a final conclusion. The Council should preserve its unity 
and continue to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons-
United Nations Joint Investigative Mechanism so that it can carry out its investigations 
in a professional, objective and fair manner and in accordance with the mandate that 
was conferred to it by resolution 2319 (2016).” (Statement by Ambassador…, 28.02.2017a)
With its interpretation of multilateralism and its pressuring to speak with one 
voice, China also waved the draft resolution on the chemical weapons attack on 4 April 
in Khan Shaykhun (S/2017/315). This was the eighth time that Russia used its veto power 
on a question related to Syria, and, in this case, China abstained. China informed others 
of its position by saying that the resolution was put forward even with the knowledge 
that there was no way that it would be supported by all UNSC members: 
 “It has been our long-standing hope that the Security Council would speak as one 
voice on the chemical weapons issue in Syria. […] We deeply regret the failure to reach 
such a consensus on the draft resolution. The attempt to push through a draft resolu-
tion in which serious division still remained among Council members was destined to 
undermine Council unity and impair efforts to seeking a political solution.”  (Statement 
by Ambassador…, 2017a)
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In 2018, the atmosphere at the UN Security Council became particularly heated 
after the use of chemical weapons at Douma. Immediately following that event, the United 
States decided to put forward a resolution to create an independent investigative mecha-
nism. Russia, for its part, organised a vote on a proposal for an alternative investigative 
mechanism and a new resolution supporting the OPCW investigative mechanism with 
respect to Douma. Russia vetoed the U.S. resolution but China abstained. China said it 
supported an investigation but that accusations of guilt cannot be made till investigation 
is completed: 
 “There should be no prejudgment of the outcome or arbitrary conclusions. […] The draft 
resolution that was just put to the vote in the Security Council (S/2018/321) had ele-
ments of consensus […]. However, on some specific measures, it does not take full 
consideration of some of the major concerns of certain Security Council members on 
improving the mechanism’s working methods and ensuring an objective and impartial 
investigation. (Statement by Ambassador…, 2018)
It is worth adding that on the question of chemical weapons, the UNSC has 
managed to adopt resolutions and that not all were blocked. For example, considering 
the reports of the OPCW Mission, in 2015, the UNSC adopted a resolution which created 
JIM (U.N. Doc. S/RES/2235). In March 2015, the UNSC adopted a resolution in which it 
condemned the use of toxic chemicals and chemical weapons in Syria, but this was done 
without pointing a finger at the likely perpetrators (U.N. Doc. S/RES/2209).
3 China’s Position Regarding the Syrian 
Civil War: The Motives
The political discourse analysis of Chinese statements and explanations of 
the vetoes cast at the UNSC regarding the Syrian civil war show that, from the very 
beginning of that conflict, China refers to two grand concepts of international law – state 
sovereignty and non-interference. In addition, coordination with the official government 
is regarded as the optimal way to approach crisis regulation, but achieving an indisput-
able univocality within UNSC is deemed the only tolerable atmosphere and technique 
for decision-making in the sphere of international peace and security. 
In its statements given at the time that votes were cast, China clearly conceptualises 
the idea of state sovereignty and non-interference in a very rigid and outdated manner, 
thus trying to push the international society many decades back, when the concepts of 
human rights and international criminal law were not yet so prominent. This behav-
iour fits into a larger Chinese ideological area which is called “global competition over 
the means of governance” (Starling et al., 2021) and an “all-encompassing game plan for 
survival in a turbulent world” (Kirchberger et al., 2021).
Stability maintenance is a complex concept with an aim to ensure the status and 
positions of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and President Xi Jinping. A very impor-
tant element of this concept is, the so-called, social stability management which includes 
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harsh laws and human rights breaches against different social groups that are regarded as 
destabilising powers. The most prominent example is ethnic Uighurs in Xinjiang, which 
are treated as terrorists and placed in, the so-called, Uighur education training centres 
that are merely concentration camps. Nevertheless, the concerns about Chinese human 
rights violations are even broader, encompassing repressions against Chinese intellec-
tuals, numerous issues including surveillance and scrutiny of regular citizens, forced 
sterilisation, abortion, and other coercive population control measures (Roth, 2019). 
The issue of human rights abuses against Uighurs and other Muslims in the Xinjiang 
region has already been raised in a closed UNSC meeting in 2019, and during heated 
debates China’s claim was that the UNSC has no rights to dispute this issue since it is 
an internal matter of China (U.S., Germany slam…, 2019). In other words – in the face 
of growing international attention on human rights abuses, China has adopted a firm 
stance that such scrutiny is not just unwanted but also an unjustifiable interference in 
their internal matters and a violation of state sovereignty, endangering the CCP course 
toward stability maintenance. 
Clearly, interpretation of the concepts of state sovereignty and non-interference is 
at the core of this principled discord. In international law and international relations in 
general, the principles of non-interference and state sovereignty go hand in hand. Article 
2(7) of the United Nations Charter speaks about the principle of non-intervention and 
links it with “matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction”:
 “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to inter-
vene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or 
shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present 
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures 
under Chapter VII.” (United Nations Charter)
Analysis of China’s argumentation in the UNSC clearly shows that China interprets 
the international community’s interest about CCP activities against societal groups in 
China as “matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction” and therefore, in 
the light of the UN Charter – as violation of sovereignty, although nowadays international 
human rights and international law, including international criminal law have limited 
the concept of sovereignty dramatically. China’s international behaviour and attempts 
to reinterpret the content of the concept of sovereignty therefore have the potential to 
restore the academic discussion and debates in the practice of international relations. For 
nearly two decades, the concept of sovereignty has been acknowledged as problematic, 
and more complex and hierarchical than a classic understanding of it would involve (Lake, 
2003), but China’s case today brings this debate to the forefront of global governance and 
the domain of war and peace in an operational sense.
Political discourse analysis shows that China opposes actions of the interna-
tional community at large and the UNSC in particular in situations that it perceives as 
an external pressure in favour of regime change in Syria, since it has the potential to create 
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a precedent and destabilise the socio-political situation in China and abroad (Jafarova, 
2014). Therefore, striving for the stability of the regime and the existing political order 
goes hand in hand with China’s global aspirations.
Conclusions
The Syrian case affirms the enormous power granted for the permanent UNSC 
members, as well as the wide spectrum of possibilities for the eventual use of veto rights. 
The political discourse analysis of China’s statements in the UNSC on the Syrian issue 
shows that China has become very vocal and more aggressive in its rhetoric. China uses 
the case of the Syrian civil war in the UNSC to shape global governance in a way that satis-
fies CCP interests both internationally and domestically. The article shows that China’s 
voting behaviour in the UNSC regarding the Syrian civil war is consistent and pragmatic. 
It is focused on reinterpretation of two grand concepts of international law: state sover-
eignty and non-intervention. 
China sees the state-owned and state-led process and a rigid concept of inviolability 
of state sovereignty and territorial integrity as the most appropriate solution of the case 
of Syria, by opting out of a military intervention, and all the decisions must be made 
in close cooperation with the government – the regime of Bashar al-Assad. Breach of 
state sovereignty, in China’s view, can also occur in a form of strong condemnation of 
the regime or threats of sanctions.
China’s motivation for such international behaviour is related both to its rise 
as a global power generally, and a possibility to shape the understanding about core 
principles of the international system and international cooperation in a way that helps 
maintain stability at home. For China, it is not the situation in and around Syria that 
raises a reaction, it is the situation in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Tibet, and other issues 
directly related to violations of international law and human rights that already have 
caught attention of international society and have the potential to destabilise the regime.
Therefore, in analysis of China’s voting behaviour in the UNSC regarding the Syrian 
civil war three main aspects stand out. First, Syria’s case obviously serves as a battle-
ground for China’s larger political ambitions, which are vaguely related to the case of 
Syria itself. Second, since the very beginning the political discourse analysis of China’s 
argumentation and explanation of its voting outlines the very nature of this battlefield, 
and it falls into category of values and interpretation of principles of multilateralism. 
China’s voting behaviour in the UNSC must be observed as a serious attempt to revisit 
and consolidate different borders for the governing principles of the international system. 
Therefore, it must be assessed from the point of view of social constructivism, although 
it also has characteristics of neorealism, which sees international organisations as tools 
at the disposal of states, the elements of the balance of power theory or even neoliberal 
institutionalism. Third, this case is a proof of the old principle “foreign policy begins 
at home” or the German principle of “Primat der Innenpolitik” (primacy of domestic 
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politics) – China’s active attempts to reshape the principles of non-interference and 
sovereignty are directly related to its domestic policy and the eventual response of inter-
national society to the situation in China. 
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